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PER CuRIAM.

Petitioner was co1wictecl in the state trial court of violating a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the dissemination
of "lewd, obscene or indecent written matter, picture,
sound recording, or film." He vms sentenced to consecutive one-year terms in the Green Bay Reformatory and
fined $1 ,000 on each of two counts. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin upheld his conviction against his contention
that he had been deprived of freedom of the press in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioner was the publisher of an underground newspaper called "Kaleidoscope." In an issue published in
May, 1968, that newspaper carried a story entitled "The
One Hundred Thousand Dollar Photos" on an interior
page. The story itself was an account of the arrest of
one of Kaleidoscope's photographers on a charge of possession of obscene material. Two relatively small pictures, showing a nude man and nude woman embracing
in a sitting position, accompanied the article and were
described in the article as "similar" to those seized from
the photographer. The article said that the photographer, while waiting in the district attorney's office, had
heard that bail might be set at $100,000. The article
went on to say that bail had in fact been set originally
at $100, then raised to $250, and that later the photographer had been released on his own recognizance. The
article purported to detail police tactics which were described as an effort to "harass" Kaleidoscope and its
staff.
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Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1957), held that
obscenity was not protected under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Obscenity was there defined as
material which "to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest." 354 U. S., at 489. In enunciating this test,
the Court in Roth quoted from Thornhill v. Alabama,
310
88, 101-102:

u. s.

"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint or fear
of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom
from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to
supply the public need for information and educa-

tion with respect to the significant issues of the
times . . . . "
We do not think it ran fairly be said. either considering the article as it appears or the record before the state
court, that the article \Yas a mere vehicle for the publication of the picture. .A quotation from Voltaire in the
flyleaf of a book ''"ill not constitutionally redeem an
otherwise ohsc<.'ne publication, but if these pictures were
indeed similar to the one scizccl-ancl "·e do not understand the State to contend differently-they arc relevant
to the theme of the article. 'Yc find it unnecssary to
consider whether the State could constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of the pictures by themselves,
because in the context in \Yhich they appeared in the
newspaper they \YCre rationally related to an article which
itself was clearly cntitkcl to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thornhill v. Alabama, supra. The
conviction on count one must therefore be reversed.
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In its August 1968 issue. Kaleidoscope published a
two-page spread consisting of 11 poems, one of which
was entitled "Sex Poem." The second count of petitioner's conviction was for the dissemination of the
newspaper containing this poem. The poem is an undisguiscdly frank , play-by-play account of the author's
reco11cction of sexual intercourse. But as the Rolh
Court emphasized, "sex and obscenity are not synonymous. . . . The portrayal of sex, e. g., in art, literature
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny
matcral the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press." 354 U. S., at 487. A reviewing court must,
of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well
as .its content.
In this case, considering the poem's content and its
placement amid a selection of poems in the interior of
a newspaper, ''"e believe that it bears some of the earmarks of an attempt at serious art. While such earmarks are not inevitably a guarantee against a finding
of obscenity. and while in this case many would conclude
that the author's reach exceeded his grasp, this element
must be considered in assessing whether or not the
"dominant" theme of the material is to prurient interest.
While "contemparary community standards," Roth v.
Unit ed States, 354 U. S., at 489, must leave room for
some latitude of judgment on the part of state courts,
and while there is an undeniably subjective clement in
the test as a whole, the "dominance" of the theme is a
question of constitutional fact. Giving due weight and
respect to the conclusions of the trial court and to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we do not believe that it
can be said that the dominant theme of this poem appeals to prurient interest. The judgment on the second
count, therefore, must also be reversed.
Reversed.
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.
Petitioner operates a bookstore in Fremont, California.
On two occasions, a police officer visited the store and
purchased four magazines and one paperback novel.
While in the store the second time, the officer also
"looked at parts" of 12 additional magazines and 14
other paperback books which were on petitioner's shelves.
Based upon a reading of the four magazines, portions
of the book, and the officer's conclusory affidavit, a
magistrate issued an ex parte search warrant authorizing
the seizure of the publications the officer had earlier purchased or perused. The warrant was executed and 78
copies of 35 different titles were seized. Among the
items seized were 19 copies of nine magazines not specified in the warra.nt and apparently not previously evaluated by a magistrate.
Petitioner was charged with the sale or distribution
of obscene matter in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.2.
Petitioner made a motion under §§ 1538.5, 1539, 1540 of
the Cal. Penal Code to suppress the evidence and to
return the property seized. The municipal court ordered
the return of the books which had not been specified in
the \Yarrant and of one book which it found not to be
obscene. 1 It denied petitioner's motion in all other reIt does not appear that the rCS]10ndent appealed from that portion of the municipal court's order suppressing the books which
had not bern specified in the warrant or which had been found not
to be obscene. The Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld the admis'ibility of those books which had not been specified in the warrant
and vacated the municipal court's order to the contrary.
1

2
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spects. On appeal, the Appellate Department of the
Superior Court ordered the suppression of those items
which had been seized without a prior adversary hearing
on their obscenity vel non but affirmed the municipal
court with regard to the materials which had been
purchased. The State then appealed and the Court of
Appeal reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate
Department and vacated in part the judgment of the
municipal court, thereby allowing the admission into
evidence of all the items except the one which had been
determined not to be obscene. 17 Cal. App. 3d 865, 95
Cal. Rptr. 242. The Supreme Court of California denied
a hearing and petitioner now "eeks a writ of certiorari.
Our jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts is
limited to "[f j inal judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had . . . . " 28 U. S. C. ~ 1257. The finality requirement, which has been with us since the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ~ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85, is "[d]esigned to avoid the
evils of piecemeal review," Republic Natural Gas Co. v.
Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62, 67, and is founded upon "considerations generally applicable to good judicial administration." Radio Station WOfV, In c. v. Johnson , 326
U. S. 120. 124. Our decisions make clear, however, that
"this provision of the statute [has long been given a]
practical rather than a technical construction." Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546. Thus,
where denial of review would effectively foreclose our
later consideration of a federal claim, Cal·ifornia v.
Stewart, 383 U. S. 903, 386 U. S. 436, 498 n. 71; Hill v.
Chicago & Evanston R. Co., 140 U.S. 52, 54; ''"here postponement of review \Yould seriously erode a federal
policy, Local No. 438 Y. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550;
Rosenblatt Y. American Cyanamid Co ., 86 S. Ct. 1, 3;
or "·here determination of preliminary questions might
avoid subsequent litigation, Mercantile iVational Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 558, we have determin0d
that the requirement of finality had been satisfied.

·.

CliAPl\IA~

v. CALIFORNIA

Similarly, where the subsequent proceedings in state
court would deny the federal right for the vindication
of which review was sought, we have concluded that the
case was final. Sec, e. g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U. S. 213 (speedy trial); Harris v. Washington, 404
U. S. 55 (double jeopardy); Colombo v. New York, 405
U. S. (double jeopardy). And, as MR. JusTICE
WHITJD indicated for the Court in Mercantile Nalional
Bank v. Langdeau, supra, at 558, ''"e have found the
policies underlying § 1257 satisfied where the matter to
be revic11·ed was entirely "separate and independent"
from those to be raised in the subsequent state
proceedings.~

In Mills Y. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, a case strikingly
similar to the prescllt one, we determined that the finality
requirement had been met. There, the trial court had
Pustained a demurrer to the complaint, but the Supreme
Court of Alabama reversed and remanded for trial.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for eight members of the
Court, concluded that we had jurisdiction under § 1257:
"The State has moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the Alabama Supreme Court's
judgment is not a 'final judgment' and therefore not
appealable under § 1257. The State argues that
since the Alabama Supreme Court remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with its opinion (which would include
a trial), the Supreme Court's judgment cannot be
considered 'final.' This argument has a surface
2 "Thi~

is a sepnrate nnd indepC'miC'nt maitC'r, antrrior to the
merih nncl not rnmrHhC'd in the factual and lrgnl i~'urs eomprising
the plaintiff'~ cau~r of action. :!\Iorconr, 1\'C' l)('liC'\'C' that it SC'rYes
the polic~· UIJdrrl~·ing thC' rr(]uirrn1C'nt of fin:dity in 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257 to detrrmine now in which ~<tate court apprllnnt~ m:1y lw
tried rathC'r thnn to ~ubjrct them , nllCI nppelleC', to long and comp!C'x litigation which mn~· all be for nnught if rolwiciC'rntion of the
preliminnry quC'~t ion of nnue is po ·tponecl until the ronrlusion or
the prorC'C'cling~." 371 U. S. , nt 558.
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plausibility, since it is true the judgment of the
State Supreme Court did not literally end the case.
It did, however, render a judgment binding upon
the trial court that it must convict Mills under this
state statute if he wrote and published the editorial. Mills concedes that he did, and he therefore has no defense in the Alabama trial court.
Thus if the case goes back to the trial court, the
trial, so far as this record shows, would be no more
than a few formal gestures leading inexorably towards a conviction, and then another appeal to the
Alabama Supreme Court for it formally to repeat
its rejection of Mills' constitutional contentions
whereupon the case could then once more wind its
weary way back to us as a judgment unquestionably final and appealable. Such a roundabout process 'vould not only be an inexcusr.ble delay of the
benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for
appeal to this Court, but it would also result in
a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy
in judicial systems already troubled by delays due
to congested dockets. The language of § 1257 as
we construed it in Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 345 U. S. 379, 381-383, does not require a
result leading to such consequences. See also Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 548-551;
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 7274. Following those cases we hold that we have
jurisdiction." 384 U. S., at 217-218. (Footnotes
omitted.)
In a concurring opinion joined by MR.
I said:

JusTICE BREN-

NAN,

"We deal here with the rights of free speech and
press in a basic form: the right to express views on
matters before the electorate. In light of appellant's concession that he has no other defense to
offer should the case go to trial, and considering

..

I
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the importance of the First Amendment rights at
stake in this litigation, it would require regard for
some remote, theoretical interests of federalism to
conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction because
of the unlikely possibility that a jury might disregard a trial judge's instructions and acquit.
"Indeed, even had appellant been unwilling to
concede that he has no defense-apart from the
constitutional question-to the charges against him,
we would be warranted in reviewing this case. That
result follows a fortiori from our holdings that
where First Amendment rights are jeopardized by
a state prosecution which, by its very nature,
threatens to deter others from exercising their First
Amendment rights, a federal court will take the
extraordinary step of enjoining the state prosecution." 384 U. S., at 221. (Citations omitted.)
The issues petitioner tenders are important ones.
They go to the constitutionality of mass seizures of
materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment, Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205; Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U. S. 717; the need for a
prior adversary hearing before protected materials are
condemned as obscene, Lee Art Theatres, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636; Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra;
the procedural burdens which must be overcome to
secure the return of protected materials, United States v.
Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363; cf. Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51; The sufficiency of the officer's
affidavit, the seizure of materials not specified in the
warrant, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 569 (STEWART, J., concurring); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S.
192; and, of course, the obscenity vel non of the
publications.
No significant question of fact or law remains for
trial. It seems beyond argument that petitioner possessed the publications in question "for sale or distribu-

6
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tion." Cal. Penal Code § 311.2. Petitioner's only
viable defenses appear to be whether the publications
were constitutionally protected and whether their seizure
in some way was procedurally defective. These issues
"·ere passed upon by the courts below and arc now before
us for decision.
The purpose of furthering economy in judicial administration would be plainly be served by deciding these
questions now rather than by sending petitioner through
the formalities of a trial and months-if not years-of
repetitious appellate review before allowing him to present to this Court again the very issues that are here
now.a California has sought to conserve its judicial
resources by providing pretrial appellate review of suppression hearings. Where the admissibility of evidence
is the only real issue, this policy generally results either
in the prompt dismissal of the charges without trial or
in a plea bargain and guilty plea. The interests in the
smooth working of our federal system and our accommodation of California's interests in pretrial adjudication of dispositive questions of law dictate that we not
postpone our consideration of the federal questions now
presented.
This is not a case involving only a pretrial motion
to su11press. Rather, the motion now before us embraces all of the evidence the prosecution will introduce at trial and common to all of these items is the
issue of their obscenity vel non. Mills v. Alabama,
supra, teaches that where First Amendment rights are
involved, compliance with procedural formalities before
allowing their vindication in this Court is not necessary
unless those procedures are meaningful.
I would follow Mills and grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari and put the case down for argument.
a E,·rn if the California courts refuse to rrronsidrr their earlirr
petitioner will be free to presrnt thr ~ame claims now rai~ed
in the 11resent petition for a writ of certiorari. R. Stem & E. Gre~~
man, Supreme Court Practice 102 (4th ad. 1969).
ruling~,

....
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, concurring.
I concur in the judgment because neither logic, history,
nor the plain meaning of the English language will support the obscenity exception this Court has engrafted
onto the First Amendment. United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Filrn, ante, a t - (DouGLAS, J., concurring).
This case, moreover, is further testimony to the morass in which this Court has placed itself in the area of
obscenity. Miller v. California, ante, at (DouGLAS,
J., dissenting). Men are sent to prison under definitions
which they cannot understand and on which lower courts
and members of this Court cannot agree. Here, the
Court is forced to examine the thematic content of the
two newspapers for the publication of which petitioner
was prosecuted in order to hold that they are constitutionally protected. Highly subjective inquiries such as
this do not lend themselves to a workable or predictable
rule of law, nor should they be the basis of fines or
imprisonment.
In this case, the vague umbrella of obscenity laws was
used in an attempt to run a radical newspaper out of
business and to impose a two-year sentence and a $2,000
fine upon its publisher. If obscenity laws continue in
this uneven and uncertain enforcement, then the vehicle
has been found for the suppression of any unpopular
tract. The guarantee of free expression will thus be
diluted and in its stead public discourse will only embrace
that which has the approval of five members of this Court.
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The prospect is not imaginary now that the Bill of
Rights, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment is coming to be a "watered down" I
version, meaning not what it does when applied to the
Federal Government but only what a majority of this
Court thinks fit and proper.
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